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Law’s Virtues: Fostering Autonomy and Solidarity in American 
Society
Cathleen Kaveny
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012.
292 pp., $29.95
Reviewed by David S. Caudill, Villanova University School of Law, Penn-
sylvania
In the months prior to the 2012 presidential election, some of those who read Forming Consciences for Faithful Citizenship, the United States Con-ference of Catholic Bishops’ (USCCB) guide to voting, undoubtedly felt 
uncomfortable. Does a Catholic search in vain for the pro-life, family values 
candidate determined to protect the poor, the rights of workers, and God’s 
creation? Or, does he or she become a single-issue voter, ignoring paragraph 
42 (“As Catholics we are not single-issue voters”) but following the spirit of 
the USCCB guide? As Notre Dame Law Professor Cathleen Kaveny de-
scribes:
Nowhere does the document straightforwardly allow a conscientious 
voter to select a pro-choice candidate if there is a pro-life candidate 
in the race. In contrast, on numerous occasions [it] affirms the deci-
sion to refuse to cast a vote for a pro-choice candidate, even if the only 
alternative is to refrain from voting altogether…[T]he issues [are] 
lexically ordered: First consider abortion and then consider everything 
else. (p. 197)
Law’s Virtues is a courageous, well-reasoned analysis of current issues at 
the intersection of religion, morality, and law. Kaveny wades into our divisive 
political environment and faces head-on the ongoing controversy over how 
Christians should try to influence the laws of a pluralistic, democratic na-
tion. Published on the eve of the 2012 election, Law’s Virtues nevertheless will 
serve as a primer for the next few election cycles. For readers who firmly side 
with the targets of her criticism, Kaveny’s book may have little impact other 
than to draw ire. But for readers who want to reflect pragmatically on dif-
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ficult questions of faith and law, Kaveny’s arguments are both compelling and 
helpful.
The hint that Law’s Virtues will be pragmatic—and not idealistic—is 
found in the preface’s epigram, a 17th-century quotation from Isidore of 
Seville:
Law should be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom 
of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly ex-
pressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for 
no private benefit, but for the common good. (p. xi; emphasis added)
In the chapters that follow, Kaveny rejects both the view that law should 
be morally neutral—because law inevitably (in its pedagogical function) 
teaches moral lessons—and the view that law should enforce morality—
because there are too many moral disagreements even among and within 
different religious communities. Kaveny also rejects the law-as-police-officer, 
or “negative constraints” image of law, instead seeing law as a positive force 
in creating the conditions of autonomy (which promote freedom to shape 
one’s life), and in leading “men and women to virtue in order to promote the 
common good” (p. 29; citing Aquinas, Summa theologica, I-II, q. 91 art. 4). Ka-
veny offers the Civil Rights Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as examples of law’s moral pedagogy, 
and, significantly, as illustrations of the limits of law. For example, the ADA 
“communicates a normative vision…[but] it does not attempt to immediately 
realize each and every element of that vision by using the coercive force of 
law” (p. 36). That is, legislators must “consider how [a] law will actually func-
tion” (p. 46), which entails a practical evaluation alongside considerations of 
cost and public support.
The centerpiece of Law’s Virtues (chapters 3–7) is Kaveny’s detailed le-
gal analysis of life issues in courts and legislatures (i.e., abortion, the failed 
Freedom of Choice Act (FOCA), genetic information, and assisted suicide). 
With respect to assisted suicide, Kaveny acknowledges that “thoughtful 
Americans of goodwill have a range of opinions,” but she highlights the 
“danger of coercion or the risk of manipulating vulnerable patients to ‘choose’ 
death prematurely” (p. 180). As to genetic information, Kaveny worries about 
relying on probabilistic information to make decisions about one’s life or 
one’s child’s life. Moreover, FOCA is Kaveny’s example of a law, in Isidore 
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of Seville’s terms, which is not clearly expressed, leading to uncertainty and 
misunderstanding. Most importantly, in light of the realities that women 
with low incomes constitute the majority of abortions, that women who want 
abortions will find a way to obtain them, and that women facing crisis preg-
nancies are “only slightly less vulnerable” than the unborn, we should attend 
to Pope John Paul II’s insight that the “underlying causes of attacks on life 
have to be eliminated, especially by ensuring proper support for families and 
motherhood” (p. 89; quoting Evangelium vitae, para. 90). Ending abortion 
and increasing social support go hand in hand.
The last part of Law’s Virtues (chapters 8–10) addresses voters, and Kaveny 
is respectfully critical of the recent bishops’ published guides, in which the 
issue of abortion is prioritized to such an extent that it eclipses issues of the 
economy, poverty, education, food policy, housing, military expenditures, vio-
lence, labor rights, immigration, and caring for the environment. If abortion 
is made an absolute priority, a difficulty arises “from the fact that changing 
the status [quo] does not score nearly as high [as other issues] on the scales 
of urgency, amenability to improvement, or ripeness for intervention” from 
federal courts (p. 207). No elected official can make an immediate change, 
and Kaveny questions the effectiveness of a strategy aimed at the president’s 
ability to choose Supreme Court justices. Even if Roe v. Wade were overruled, 
many states would legalize abortion, and women with crisis pregnancies 
could travel to those states. Therefore, the economy should be a key pro-life 
concern, because “the number of abortions is correlated…to the economic 
and social circumstances of women facing crisis pregnancies” (p. 209). More-
over, “staggering” healthcare costs for the growing elderly population renews 
pressure to legalize physician-assisted suicide (p. 209).
I especially appreciated Kaveny’s critique of the extremist discourse in the 
“culture wars,” which leads voters into a oversimplified, binary framework 
treating actions as either so morally objectionable to be criminally prohibited, 
or so “morally good [to be] federally funded, and widely practiced” (p. 273). 
Rhetorical and evocative use of the terms “intrinsic evil” (theologically, an 
analytically technical term that “says nothing about the comparative grav-
ity of the act” in question [p. 221]) and “complicity with evil” (conceptually 
unsound in relation to a voter’s responsibility [p. 244]) should be tempered. In 
Kaveny’s view, taking into account the common good:
[A] solitary vote for a pro-choice politician is not likely to make 
any significant difference to any particular woman’s [constitution-
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ally protected] decision for or against abortion…[V]oters might well 
judge that voting for a candidate who supports a large safety net for 
mothers and dependent children would be a better way to increase the 
number of children brought to term. (p. 256)
In any event, these matters deserve a “nuanced, respectful discussion that is 
not easily facilitated in the rhetoric and mind-set of the ‘culture wars’” (p. 275).
My only criticism of Law’s Virtues is the absence of any detailed analy-
sis of recent controversies over insurance coverage for medical birth control 
and the legalization of gay marriage, issues that are both divisive among 
voters and relevant to the scope of Kaveny’s study. Others will be critical of 
her pragmatism, but I take to heart her recommendation that, in the public 
square, Christians should “try to be teachers rather than warriors” (p. 276).
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